Abstract-For noncooperative networks in which each node is a selfish agent, certain incentives must be given to intermediate nodes to let them forward the data for others. What makes the scenario worse is that, in a multihop noncooperative network, the end points can only observe whether or not the end-to-end transaction was successful or not, but not the individual actions of intermediate nodes.
INTRODUCTION
M ANY networks are composed of terminals that are owned by incentive-driven individuals. We call them noncooperative networks hereafter. In multihop wireless ad hoc networks, it is commonly assumed that each terminal offers its local resources to forward the data for other terminals to serve the common good, and benefits from resources offered by other terminals to route its packets in return. However, limitations of energy supply, memory, and computing resources of these individual devices raise concerns on this traditional assumption. A networking device owned by an individual user may prefer not participating in the routing to save its energy and resources. Therefore, if we assume that all users are selfish, incentives must be provided to encourage networking terminals' participation, and thus, to maintain the robustness and availability of networking systems.
The question turns to how the incentives are designed. Assume that each intermediate wireless node i will incur a marginal cost cði; jÞ if it is asked to forward a unit amount of data to a neighboring node j. Here, we assume that the cost cði; jÞ is a piece of private information known only by node i (some studies, e.g., [46] , assumed that it is determined by both i and j if cði; jÞ only depends on transmission power). Consider a unicast routing and forwarding protocol based on the least cost path (LCP): each terminal is asked to declare a cost for forwarding a unit amount of data for other terminals, and the least cost path connecting the source and the target terminal is then selected. A very naive incentive is to pay each terminal its declared cost. However, the individual terminal may declare an arbitrarily high cost for forwarding to increase its payment. Then the "least cost path" selected based on the falsely declared cost information may be different from the actual least cost path computed based on the truthful cost information of all individual nodes. We call this as the hidden information game: the information needed to find the best output is hidden from the decision maker. Here, we would like to design a payment scheme such that every terminal will report its cost truthfully and always forward others' traffic out of its own interest to maximize its profit. This payment scheme is called strategyproof in the literature since it removes speculation and counterspeculation among terminals.
An essential argument in [46] for showing that no dominant strategy exists for forwarding is that the action of each intermediate node is hidden from others. When a node u dropped certain packets, it is difficult (if not impossible) for other nodes to distinguish whether this node u intentionally dropped the packets or the packets were lost simply due to the unreliability of channels (e.g., noise, interference from other nodes) although node u did send the packets. We call this kind of game as hidden action game, where the end points can only observe whether or not the packet has reached the destination but cannot attribute failure to a specific node on the path. Note that, in multihop wireless ad hoc networks, even if some monitoring mechanisms are in place to allow the sender or the receiver to pinpoint the location of the failure, they may still be unable to attribute the causes of failure to either the deliberate action of some intermediate node(s), or some external factors beyond the control of these intermediate nodes, such as network congestion, channel interference, or data corruption. We assume that the link failures are independent among different links. We want to design protocols that can eliminate the hidden action without using additional monitoring scheme. Note that when the failures are not totally independent, it may be possible for some agents (a wireless node in wireless ad hoc networks) to tell whether a failure is due to the natural hazard, or due to the intentionally dropping data by a node. Our protocols will remove the intentional drop using a simple payment scheme without relying on any monitoring scheme. The problem of hidden action is also known as moral hazard, which has long been of interest in the economics literature concerning information asymmetry and incentives.
We will focus on designing cost-efficient strategyproof routing protocols under both hidden information and hidden action. We assume that all sessions have a common receiver, which is a trusted authority. We propose several efficient methods that can induce truthfulness and eliminate the hidden actions with high probability for various network models and routing requirements. In our protocols, each selfish agent will maximize its expected profit when it truthfully declares its cost and acts truthfully following its declared actions. Compared with some closely related results [15] , [46] , the main contributions of this paper are given below.
In all our models, the source node s has a valuation ðs; dÞ for sending a unit amount of data from the source to the destination node d. We consider two complementary cases: ðs; dÞ is infinite and ðs; dÞ is finite. A naive method is to ask the source declare ðs; dÞ and each other node declare its cost for forwarding a unit amount of data. The least cost path is used to connect s and d and the VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is then used to compute a payment for every node on LCP. The source node s decides to perform routing only when the total VCG payment to all relay nodes is at most ðs; dÞ. We show that when ðs; dÞ is infinite, the VCG mechanism is still strategyproof. We then show by example that, however, when ðs; dÞ is finite, this simple VCG mechanism will not induce truthfulness from agents. We then design strategyproof routing schemes for this scenario. In our mechanism, the payment to each node is still VCG payment, but the rule by the source node for deciding whether to conduct routing is carefully designed to ensure strategyproofness. Besides strategyproof schemes, we design a routing scheme using a Nash Equilibrium and show how to efficiently find a Nash Equilibrium that maximizes the payment.
Our routing scheme takes into account the unreliability of wireless links and each node will declare a quality of service (QoS) for forwarding the packets and the marginal cost for providing such QoS. Thus, a selfish agent could manipulate multiple parameters such as its service cost and QoS. The reliability QoS and cost information will be collected from individual agents to the trusted authority. The final routing should always ensure a reliable delivery of packets from the source to the destination. We study two reliable routing models: link layer reliability (where retransmissions start from the failed any link) and transport layer reliability (where retransmissions start from the source node). Strategyproof routing schemes are designed for almost all possible combinations of reliable routing models, one/multiparameter models, and valuation models. We show that in our schemes, fulfilling the declared QoS is the optimal strategy for each agent. Our mechanisms can deal with both hidden information and hidden action and they can be easily integrated with existing routing protocols. Here, we mainly focus on reliability as a QoS measurement. We leave it as a future work to design strategyproof mechanisms that can ensure other QoS measurements such as (soft or hard) deadline requirements.
We also conduct extensive simulations to study the overhead of our proposed mechanisms compared with the ideal situation when all intermediate nodes are cooperative. Our simulations show that the payments by our mechanisms are only slightly larger than the actual cost incurred by all intermediate nodes even the costs of different nodes could vary significantly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our network model and the problems to be studied. In Section 3, we present our methods that can efficiently deal with the hidden actions and hidden information and ensure the reliable routing in the link layer. In Section 4, we present routing mechanisms for the reliable transport layer routing. We briefly discuss the protocols when senders could be selfish in Section 5. We report our simulation results in Section 6, review the related work in Section 7, and finally, conclude the paper in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES, NETWORK MODEL

Network Model
We assume that there is a set V of n ¼ jV j of devices (called nodes hereafter) and each node is assigned a unique ID i 2 ½1; n. For simplicity, we assume that the nodes are static or can be viewed as static for a long enough time period. The multihop network is modeled by a directed communication graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ, where E is the set of m ¼ jEj directed links. We always assume that the nodes are selfish agents: they will take the actions to maximize their own benefits. We consider a principal-agent model, where the principal is either the sender s or the receiver d of a communication, and the agents are the intermediate nodes capable of forwarding packets between the communication end points. We also assume that in the network, there is a trusted authority that will perform all payment computations and is in charge of payment management. For example, the gateway node(s) in a mesh network can serve as a trusted authority [12] . For simplicity, we assume that all communication sessions have the trusted authority as the destination node. Thus, the trusted receiver will be called principal hereafter. Note that it has been proved in [39] that no mechanism is strategyproof and budget-balanced when the shortest path is used for routing. We will later discuss on the scenario when the principal could also be selfish.
The sender will get a value ðs; dÞ if a unit amount of data reaches the destination. If it has to pay amount of monetary value to intermediate relay agents, then its pure profit (i.e., utility) will be ðs; dÞ À . Obviously, the sender will conduct routing only if ðs; dÞ À ! 0. As in [12] , before all nodes will participate in finding a routing path from the sender to the destination, the sender has to declare its willing payment . The sender may also have a minimum quality of service ðs; dÞ for the routing path. Here, the QoS provided by a path is often defined as the minimum quality of service provided by all nodes on the path.
We assume that when an individual node u is asked to forward once a unit amount of data to a neighboring node v, node u will incur a certain amount of marginal cost. Note that in wireless networks, even node u has sent wireless signal to node v, node v may still not be able to decode the signal correctly due to the noise and interference. We use 0 ðu; vÞ 1 to denote the reliability of the link ðu; vÞ. In other words, node v will receive the data correctly with probability ðu; vÞ after node u sends data to node v. In wireless networks, whether node v received the data packets correctly or not is only known to node v itself. When the information ðu; vÞ is only observable by node v, we call it the private information of node v, i.e., it is part of type of node v. Node v can choose to declare this private information correctly or wrongfully, depending on which will maximize its own utility. In practice, the physical layer unreliability is often caused by the Gaussian noise, which is predictable by the system or observable by many nodes if certain monitoring mechanism is implemented, thus, ðu; vÞ is viewed as public information in this scenario. In this paper, most of our studies will view this link reliability as public information. Note that this link reliability is different from the service reliability on this link, although in practice, it may be difficult to separate them in noncooperative networks with selfish nodes.
In addition, the cost incurred by a node u may also depend on the quality of service, which is provided in sending packets to v. We assume that all agents can provide a given set Q ¼ f 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; g of forwarding services. For simplicity, we assume that the QoS i is better than j for i > j. We also assume that dropping packets is the worst QoS 1 . For example, the services could be simply falways drop; always forwardg. The quality of service provided by node u will affect the probability that node v receives the data packets from u correctly. We use j ðu; vÞ to denote the probability when node v will receive the data from u correctly when node u provides forwarding service j to node v, assuming that the physical link has a perfect reliability for the moment. We call j ðu; vÞ as service reliability, which could be public information. For example, when the available services are f 1 ¼ always drop; 2 ¼ always forwardg, we have 1 ðu; vÞ ¼ 0 and 2 ðu; vÞ ¼ 1. The service reliability could also be private information, which is controlled by the sending node u. For convenience, we denote ðu; vÞ ¼ j ðu; vÞ Á ðu; vÞ as the value of the corresponding service from node u to node v.
For each service j provided by a node u to forward a unit amount of data to node v, node u will incur a certain service cost c j ðu; vÞ. There are two possible cases here: 1) node cost model, where the cost c j ðu; vÞ is dependent on u while it is independent of the node v; 2) link cost model, where the cost c j ðu; vÞ is dependent on both nodes u and v. For simplicity, we always use the general c j ðu; vÞ, which could be the same regardless of the node v.
In summary, depending on applications and whether certain monitoring schemes are implemented, a selfish agent v i may have all (or part) of the following as its private type t i : 1) the cost c j ðv i ; wÞ to provide a forwarding service to every outgoing neighbor w with a QoS j , 2) the corresponding service reliability j ðv i ; wÞ. We assume that the physical link reliability ðu; v i Þ is a public information. 
Games and Mechanism Design
! Eð i ðOðÞ; tÞ þ P i ðÞÞ:
Individual Rationality with Expectation (IRE).
Each agent has a nonnegative expected utility, i.e., 8i, 8,
Here, EðXÞ is the expected value of a variable X. A mechanism is called strategyproof with expectation (or simply strategyproof) if it satisfies ICE and IRE. In other words, we will not consider any betting preferences of agent with regard to uncertain outcomes. Or equivalently, the behavior of every agent can be predicted based on expected value of its utility. Arguably, the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [9] , [17] , [37] is the most positive result in mechanism design. Besides the dominant strategy design, there are several other concepts for mechanism design, e.g., Nash equilibrium. A vector of action profile a ¼ ða 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n Þ, where agent i plays action a i , is a Nash Equilibrium (resp. -Nash Equilibrium) if no agent i can improve its own utility (reps. by more than ) by unilaterally changing its action a i to some other action a 0 i when the actions of all other agents a Ài are fixed.
For sequential games, several refined equilibriums have been proposed in the literature, e.g., subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). SPE is a sequence of actions by players such that players' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the original game. It can be found using backward induction (see, e.g., [31] ) as follows: First, one determines the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the one next to last player is determined by assuming that the last player's action is given. The process continues until all player's actions have been determined.
Problem Specification
Assume that we want to implement a routing protocol that will route data from a source node s to a target node d. The routing protocol with selfish participating nodes will have the following components:
1. Collect Information. The sender announces its required QoS and a total willing payment for sending a unit amount of data to d. The principal (e.g., the receiver as a trusted authority) then asks every node u in the network to declare what QoS r it will provide for forwarding, the cost cðu; vÞ for forwarding a unit amount of data to a neighbor v by this QoS r , the corresponding service reliability r ðu; vÞ, and the observed link reliability ðw; uÞ for every neighbor w.
Here, we assume that every agent will encrypt its declaration and then digitally sign the encrypted declaration. We assume that the encrypted declaration of any intermediate node will be forwarded to the principal as being done in [46] . 2. Select Path. This is called the routing subgame in [46] .
Based on the information collected from all nodes, the trusted principal then finds a path v i 1 v i 2 . . . v i h for routing with a certain minimum QoS, i.e., every node on the path can provide at least this minimum QoS r . Here,
The principal also computes a certain incentive given to each intermediate node on the path to compensate the cost incurred for forwarding data. Then node v i j is asked to forward the data packets to node v ijþ1 (implicitly under QoS , where corresponding to the QoS r that node v ij would provide when node v ij declared its cost cðv ij ; v ijþ1 Þ). A key observation is that an intermediate node v ij may choose to forward the data using some QoS 0 2 Q other than its initial intention r . Note that we treat dropping packets as one of the possible quality of services. How to ensure that each intermediate node will forward the data packets using its initial intention is called the forwarding subgame, which generalizes the forwarding subgame defined in [46] . In [46] , Zhong et al. essentially assume that there are two quality of services: fdrop; forwardg. 4. Materialize Payment. Depending on the outcome of the forwarding subgame, the principal would materialize the incentive computed during the routing subgame, e.g., transfer the monetary value to intermediate nodes. In this paper, we will study a number of routing protocols using the above general framework. Specifically, the following two routing scenarios will be studied:
1. Reliable link layer. If the transmission from a node v i j to node v i jþ1 is not successful, node v i j is required to resend the data till node v i jþ1 successfully receives the data. 2. Reliable transport layer. If the transmission from a node v ij to node v ijþ1 is not successful, node v ij will discard the data and then the source node s will start the retransmission after receiving the time-out signal. This is called the TCP model. Assume that the sender has certain implemented mechanism to know if the data arrive at the target node.
Least Cost Path Construction
First, given the information of all agents, we need to find a path to connect the source node s and the target node d. The reliable minimum cost unicast routing problem is to find a path connecting s and d such that the expected total cost spent by all nodes (including the retransmissions) is minimized, given the cost cðu; vÞ ¼ c j ðu; vÞ for each link ðu; vÞ, and the probability ðu; vÞ ¼ ðu; vÞ Á j ðu; vÞ that the transmission over the link is successful. Here, we assume that node u will provide forwarding to node v with quality of service j . The construction of the least cost path has been studied recently in [3] when reliable link layer is implemented and in [10] when reliable transport layer is implemented. Given a simple path
we briefly show how to compute the expected cost, denoted as EðPÞ, of this path under both link layer and transport layer reliability models When a link layer reliability is implemented, obviously, the expected cost of path P is
Here,
is the expected number of total transmissions over link ðv i j ; v i jþ1 Þ including the initial transmission and all retransmissions.
When a transport layer reliability is implemented, let Pj ij be the subpath of P from node s ¼ v i1 to node v ij . The expected cost of path P under transport layer reliability model is then
The LCP path in transport layer reliability model thus satisfies that the subpath in LCPðs; dÞ from s ¼ v i 1 to any node v i j is also the LCP path LCPðs; v i j Þ. Thus, the LCP can always be found in time Oðm þ n log nÞ under both the reliable link layer model or the reliable transport layer model for a network of n nodes and m links.
LINK LAYER RELIABLE ROUTING
Known Information and Hidden Action
We first consider the case when all informations about the selfish nodes are already known by the principals. Let r ¼ ðs; dÞ be the minimum quality of service required by the sender. Thus, the only actions taken by a selfish node are 1) declaring whether it can provide such a service and 2) providing what kind of forwarding service actually. The main goal of the routing scheme (composed of routing subgame and forwarding subgame) is then to ensure that every selfish agent fulfill its declared forwarding service. Algorithm 1 presents our routing scheme. In Algorithm 1, the parameter ! 0 is a control parameter used to ensure that each relay node will get a positive profit with high probability when it relays enough packets. For example, we can set ¼ 1=2. If ¼ 0, the expected profit of all nodes is 0.
Algorithm 1. Link Layer Reliable Routing with Known Info
Input: graph G, QoS r required by sender and its valuation ðs; dÞ for a unit amount of data, and a fixed constant parameter ! 0.
1: Routing Subgame: First the principal asks every node u, whether it can provide a forwarding service r on link ðu; vÞ for each one of its outgoing neighbors v. We remove the node w and all the incident links ðw; vÞ from G where node w replied that it cannot provide such forwarding service r required by the principal. For each remaining link ðu; vÞ, we define its weight as c r ðu; vÞ=ð r ðu; vÞ Á ðu; vÞÞ. Let G 0 be the resulted graph. (2 j h À 1) received a data packet by the sender, it will forward the packet to the next-hop node v ijþ1 using QoS r , or using some other forwarding QoS. We will prove that, to maximize its expected benefit, the intermediate node will keep forwarding the data till it is correctly received by next-hop node. The principal materializes the payment to every intermediate agent v ij only if the target node d received the data correctly with the given QoS. In other words, if any node on the path reduced its QoS, every node on the path will not receive any payment.
Theorem 1. If a node u forwards N units amount of data truthfully, the probability that node u runs deficit is at most See [25] for the proof of the theorem. The above shows that if all intermediate nodes indeed forward the data truthfully, the probability that any node will lose money is small if there is enough data transmitted between s and d. Given N units of data to be transferred, the probability that an intermediate node will lose money is at most 1À 1ÀþNÁÁ . If we require that the probability that an intermediate node loses money is at most , then forward-
e units of data is sufficient. Keep in mind that the actual cost of an intermediate node by forwarding data correctly is a random variable with geometric distribution, which is memoryless.
Theorem 2. For every agent selected on the path P G 0 ðs; dÞ, forwarding data using the agreed QoS r is an SPE.
See [25] for the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 3. When an intermediate node does not keep forwarding the packet until it is received by its next-hop neighbor, its expected profit will be smaller.
Proof. Assume that for kth unit of data, node u tried U k transmissions (including the initial transmission and all retransmissions). Here, node u could have selfishly stopped the transmission after U k transmissions although the packet has not been received correctly. Assume that the cost for one transmission is 1 unit. Then the total cost for N units of data is P N i¼1 U i . Let X k be a random variable denoting whether the kth data packet is received correctly or not by using U k transmissions. Thus, the payment by the sender to this relay node for a successful reception is X k Á ð1þÞ=. Clearly, PrðX k ¼ 1Þ ¼1Àð1ÀÞ U k . Thus, the expected total payment by this sequence of strategies is
Thus, the expected profit by the intermediate node u is at is the additional payment node u will get from these additional m successful transmissions. Note that the expected additional cost for getting successful m transmissions is still m Á 1 since the geometry distribution is memoryless. Thus, a node will improve the expected profit
if it keeps retransmitting unsuccessful packets till they are received correctly. t u
Strategyproof Routing with Infinite Valuation
We then study how to design routing protocols when a selfish agent has certain private information, e.g., its service cost, and/or the service reliability, and the valuation of the sender is infinite. Naturally, we will use the VCG mechanism to induce the truthfulness from all relay agents; and the sender will conduct the routing only if the total VCG payment to all agents is at most its valuation. In other words, intuitively, we will have the following routing scheme described in Algorithm 2. We will show that this mechanism is not strategyproof if the sender has a finite valuation .
Algorithm 2. Naive Link Layer Reliable Routing 1: Routing subgame: First the principal asks the sender to declare its willing payment ðs; dÞ. Then it asks every node u, to declare its cost (denoted by c r ðu; vÞ) to provide a forwarding service r on link ðu; vÞ for each one of its outgoing neighbors v, and the corresponding service reliability r ðu; vÞ. For all links ðu; vÞ, we define its weight !ðu; vÞ as c r ðu; vÞ=ð r ðu; vÞ Á ðu; vÞÞ. Let G 0 be the resulted graph and P G 0 ðs; dÞ be the least cost path in G 0 to connect s and d. Let P G 0 nu ðs; dÞ be the least cost path in G 0 to connect s and d without using the node u. For any path P, let kPk denote the total weight of all intermediate nodes on the path (i.e., excluding the source). 2: The payment is computed using the VCG mechanism.
For each node u not on the path P G 0 ðs; dÞ, its payment P VCG ðuÞ is always 0. For each node u selected on this path, its VCG payment P VCG ðuÞ is We first study whether the routing scheme described in Algorithm 2 is strategyproof for relay agents when the sender has an infinite valuation ðs; dÞ, i.e., the sender would pay whatever it costs to get the data transmitted.
Theorem 4. Assume that ðs; dÞ is infinity. Truth-telling is a dominant strategy and forwarding truthfully is an SPE for all intermediate relay nodes when VCG mechanism is used for routing with link layer reliability.
Proof. To prove the above statement, we need to show that no node can involve in the following misbehavior:
1. declaring the cost truthfully, but providing lower QoS forwarding service, or 2. declaring the cost falsely, although providing the correct (or better) QoS forwarding service, or 3. declaring the cost falsely, and providing a lower QoS forwarding service. The property that the truth-telling is a dominant strategy (i.e., misbehavior 2 cannot happen) directly follows from the strategyproofness of the VCG mechanism since our final path will minimize the total expected cost of all agents, i.e., maximizing the total valuations of all agents. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we can prove that forwarding truthfully (i.e., misbehaviors 1 and 3 cannot happen) is an SPE. t u
When the sender has an infinite valuation ðs; dÞ, Algorithm 2 is budget-balanced, i.e., the money charged from the sender is same as the total money paid to all intermediate relay agents.
Strategyproof Routing with Finite Valuation
This section is devoted to designing a strategyproof routing scheme when the sender has a finite valuation.
Note that routing scheme described in Algorithm 2 fails to induce the truthfulness when the valuation ðs; dÞ is finite (an example illustrated in [25] ), which is not because of the VCG mechanism but because of the criterion (see inequality (1)) to decide when to conduct the routing. It is not difficult to observe the following:
Observation 5. If the sender performs routing only when a condition C is satisfied, to induce truthfulness from agents, the condition C should not depend on the information of agents that are selected by the strategyproof mechanism for routing subgame.
The intuition behind this is that, although any agent i cannot change its payment under a strategyproof payment mechanism by manipulating its declared information, it can reduce the payment to other agents on the output, and thus, reduce the total payment required from the sender. By careful manipulation, an agent can change the outcome of the game: it makes a positive profit by performing the routing, which will not be performed under the truthful declaration. Thus, we need to design other criterion C when the sender should perform the routing. Obviously, the condition C should not use any information of agents on path P G 0 ðs; dÞ.
Lemma 6. If a condition C by which the sender decides whether to perform routing using the path LCP (replacing the condition 1 of Algorithm 2) does not depend on the information of any node on LCP, routing scheme described by Algorithm 2 induces the truthful information declaration from all nodes.
See [25] for the proof of the theorem. Next, we discuss in detail how our routing mechanism is designed based on whether we have link cost model or node cost model.
Routing Mechanism with Node Cost
When the information (service cost and the service reliability) of a node u is independent of the outgoing neighbor v (i.e., no power adjustment is used), we next show how to design a criterion that induces the truthfulness of agents. Our approach is to find a new bound that is independent of nodes on LCP and is at least the total VCG payment to all intermediate nodes.
Assume that the LCP is P G 0 ðs; dÞ ¼ v i1 v i2 . . . v ij . . . v ih . For an intermediate node v i j , a simple path B that starts at some node v i a and ends at some node v i b is called a bridge of v i j if 1) a < j, 2) b > j, and 3) B and P G 0 ðs; dÞ have no other common node. In node cost model, the (internal) cost kBk I of a bridge B is defined as the total cost of all internal nodes of B. In link cost model, kBk I is the cost of all links in B. Given a path P and two nodes v i a , v i b on P, let B ia;ib min be the bridge with the minimum cost, starting at node v ia and ending at node v ib . Observe that P G 0 nLCP ðs; dÞ is a bridge of any internal node v i j . Clearly, the VCG payment to any node v i j is no more than the total cost of all internal nodes of any bridge of v ij . Among the bridges for node v ij , we use B min ðv ij Þ to denote the bridge with the minimum cost kB min ðv i j Þk I ¼ min i a <i j <i b B i a ;i b min . Thus, under both cost models, we have the following: Lemma 7. 8v ij 2 P G 0 ðs; dÞ, P VCG ðv ij Þ kB min ðv ij Þk I .
Note that kB min ðv ij Þk I is not affected by any node on the Fig. 1 . Moreover, the bridge B min ðv i j Þ can be found in time Oðn 3 Þ using all pairs shortest path in G 0 nv ij . Thus, based on Lemma 6, the following mechanisms are strategyproof when the sender has a finite valuation , and each node has a cost (independent of outgoing neighbors) for forwarding:
1. It uses the least cost path for routing. 2. The sender decides to conduct routing only when X hÀ1 j¼2 kB min ðv ij Þk I ðs; dÞ:
3. If the routing is performed, the payment to each relay node is computed using VCG payment. Then this criterion will induce the truthfulness from all agents. Algorithm 3 summarizes our method.
For some networks, it is possible that there may have no bridge at all for some intermediate node. We show that this happens if and only if the original network is not 2-connected. When network is 2-connected, then the removal of any node will not disconnect the network, which can clearly serve as a bridge, and vice versa. It is a not difficult to show that the VCG payment exists if and only if the network is 2-connected (i.e., there is no monopoly node in the network). Thus, when the network is not 2-connected, we cannot apply VCG mechanism at all and have to rely on some other mechanism such as the Nash Equilibrium, which will be discussed later. Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 8. For nodal cost, Algorithm 3 works correctly as long as the network is 2-connected. VCG payment is a finite value whenever the network is 2-connected.
Routing Mechanism with Link Cost
If a relay node has different costs for relaying to different nodes, we need a different criterion for deciding whether to conduct the routing. Again take Fig. 1 , for example, node v ik now can affect B min ðv ij Þ by manipulating the cost of the link ðv ik ; uÞ since link ðv ik ; uÞ contributes to the value of B min ðv ij Þ. We then study how to design criterion when the sender should perform routing in this case. We define the bridge similarly as previous case. Let kBk denote the total cost of all links on a bridge B. Let B min ðv i j Þ be the bridge for v i j with the minimum cost. Then, we have P VCG ðv ij Þ kB min ðv ij Þk. Note that if we still use criterion (inequality (2)), i.e., the sender performs routing if P hÀ1 j¼2 kB min ðv ij Þk ðs; dÞ, an internal node may lie to improve its utility as follows: Assume that sender decides not to perform routing since the inequality (2) is barely violated. Assume that the bridge B min ðv i j Þ starts with some internal node v i a with 1 < a < j. Assume that v i a u is a link on B min ðv ij Þ. Node v ia can lie down its service cost on link v ia u such that the LCP does not change. After such manipulations, P hÀ1 j¼2 kB min ðv ij Þk could be reduced to be less than ðs; dÞ, which implies that the sender will perform routing and all nodes on LCP will improve its utility.
Thus, we get a condition as follows: Instead of considering bridges that could start with any internal node on the LCP, we will only consider the bridge that starts with the source node s. . Nodal Cost Case: When the private of information of every agent is independent on its outgoing neighbor, the sender starts routing if
kB min ðv i j Þk I ðs; dÞ.
If the above conditions are not met, the sender will not initiate the routing, and the payment to every node is 0. It is easy to show that the conditions, used in Algorithm 3 by the sender to decide when to perform routing, are tight.
Recall that in the previous node cost case, the 2-connectivity is a necessary and sufficient condition for Algorithm 3 to work correctly. When a node v has different costs for sending data to different neighbors, it is easy to show that the sufficient and necessary condition for having a finite VCG payment in this case is that, for every node v, the graph H Àv (by removing v and all its incident links from G 0 ) is still connected. In other words, 2-connectivity is still necessary and sufficient condition for having a finite VCG payment. Unfortunately, we need a much stronger condition to ensure that there is a bridge starting with the source node s. We can construct a network example, such that VCG 
-Nash Equilibrium-Based Routing Subgame
So far, the routing schemes presented in this section will induce the truthfulness from agents. Possible disadvantages of ensuring the truthfulness are that 1) the sender could lose some opportunities to send data from the source to the target and 2) the payment by the sender could be larger than that by some other mechanism even the routing is performed. We then present a simple routing scheme, which will choose the same routing path as VCG mechanism, and pay less than the VCG mechanism, in the expense of losing the truthful declaration from agents. The routing scheme works as follows: Let ¼ ð 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; n Þ be a vector of the declared information by all nodes, where i is all the service cost and service reliability information declared by node v i . Let OðÞ be the optimal path found under the declaration . Since the path selection will involve tiebreaker, it was shown in [29] that there is no Nash Equilibrium in the unicast routing subgame. The authors propose to use -Nash Equilibrium in which any agent cannot improve its utility by more than if it unilaterally changes its declaration. Here, is an input parameter (with arbitrarily small value) controlled by the game. For simplicity, we still call -Nash Equilibrium as Nash Equilibrium in this paper. Recall that t is the vector of truthful declaration.
Lemma 11. For any declaration vector that is a Nash equilibrium, the optimal path OðÞ is the same as the real optimal path OðtÞ when all agents are truthful.
Proof. It is equivalent to prove that any node selected in OðtÞ (called legitimate) is still selected in OðÞ. Notice if a legitimate node is not selected, it will reduce its declaration to its true type such that it will be selected. The proof is similar to the proof in [29] , and thus, is omitted here. t u
Lemma 11 immediately implies that the social efficiency of the outcome under a Nash equilibrium is maximized, which is one of the key property of VCG mechanism. We then categorize the set of Nash equilibriums that can be formed. We only consider a Nash equilibrium where any agent that is not selected on the final least cost path will declare truthfully. Note that any such agent cannot lie to improve its utility. Without loss of generality, we assume that v i1 v i2 . . . v ih is the optimal path under truthful declaration. Let
This is the expected cost of node v ij viewed by the principal under the Nash equilibrium declaration , and also is the payment that node v i j will receive under our new routing scheme. Based on Lemma 11, the Nash equilibrium declaration must also result in the same optimal path v i 1 v i 2 . . . v i h , i.e., for any minimum cost bridge B ia;ib
The declaration must satisfy the IR property, i.e., 8v i j ,
These conditions (inequalities (4) and (5)) will define a higher dimensional polytope. Any node on the boundary of the polytope (including the truthful declaration of nodes not in the LCP) is a Nash equilibrium declaration. Let ¼ P h k¼1 x ik be the sum of the costs of all nodes on the shortest path under some Nash Equilibrium. Obviously, varies under different Nash Equilibriums, and we are interested in the worst-case performance of our routing mechanism, i.e., we want to find the Nash Equilibria such that is maximized. For notational simplicity, we term the Nash Equilibrium that maximizes the total costs as the maximum Nash Equilibria.
Note that max P h k¼1 x ik subject to constraints 4 and 5 can be solved in polynomial time using linear programming, and the solution to the linear programming is on the boundary of the polytope. This shows that maximum Nash Equilibrium can be solved by the linear programming. However, solving linear programming with up to OðnÞ variables and Oðn 2 Þ constraints could be quite costly. We present a simple method (Algorithm 5) that can elegantly compute a maximum Nash Equilibrium that also has some practical meanings. The proof of its correctness is omitted here due to the space limit. We also leave it as future work to design protocols that can reduce the number of possible Nash Equilibria.
Algorithm 5. Sequential Algorithm to Find a Maximum Nash Input: Declared cost c r ðu; vÞ for each node u. Output: A maximum Nash Equilibrium.
1: Build the graph G and compute the least cost path P G ðs; dÞ, denoted as
Compute the VCG payment P VCG ðv i k Þ for node v i k using updated cost for previous links as kP Gnu ðs; dÞk À kP G ðs; dÞk þ !ðv ik ; v ikþ1 Þ:
4:
Adjust
will be the cost declared by node v ik and it is also the payment to node v i k .
TRANSPORT RELIABLE ROUTING
In this section, we present several routing schemes to ensure the transport layer reliability. Recall that in link layer, retransmission starts from the node that loses the packet, while in transport layer, TCP layer, retransmission starts from the starting node. Thus, we often will have different paths that optimize the total relay costs by intermediate relay nodes in link layer reliable routing, and in transport layer reliable routing. We will show that the widely celebrated VCG mechanism does not induce the truth-telling action from all selfish agents when an agent can manipulate its declared cost and also the reliability of the incident links. We prove that the truth-telling action is still dominant strategy when an agent can only declare its service cost.
Known Information and Hidden Action
Here, we assume that the principal knows all information about the selfish nodes and also the minimum quality of service r ¼ ðs; dÞ required. The main goal of the routing scheme is then to ensure that every selfish agent fulfills its declared forwarding service. Our routing scheme is similar to Algorithm 1. The difference is how the path with the minimum expected cost under reliable transport model is found and how much each node should be paid. Dong et al. [10] presented a polynomial-time method to find such an optimal path, which cannot be found using traditional shortest path algorithm. Let P T G 0 ðs; dÞ be the path with the minimum cost under the TCP model and E T ðPÞ be the expected cost of a path P under TCP model. Note that the expected cost of a path P ¼ v i1 v i2 . . . v ih under the TCP model is
The routing mechanism works as follows, with a fixed constant > 0 as a control parameter:
T G 0 ðs; dÞÞ ðs; dÞ, the sender will decide to conduct the routing. Here, > 0 is a fixed constant. 2. The payment to a node not on the path is 0. For each node v ijÀ1 2 P T G 0 ðs; dÞ, its payment is
Note that the expected profit of a node v i jÀ1 that transmits N units amount of data is
Similar to Theorems 1 and 2, we have the following theorems:
Theorem 12. If all intermediate nodes forward N units amount of data truthfully, the probability that a node v ij runs deficit is no more than 2 2 þNÁÁ , where , are the standard deviation and mean of the random variable X, denoting the total number of transmissions by node v ij to let the receiver get the data correctly. Here, is a fixed constant.
Theorem 13. For all agents selected on the path P G 0 ðs; dÞ, forwarding data using the agreed QoS r is an SPE.
Hidden Cost and Hidden Action
We then study how to design routing protocols when a selfish agent has certain private information, e.g., its service cost and/or the service reliability. We will focus on the oneparameter game, where the service cost is private while all other information is public. Since only the cost cðu; vÞ is private, the objective function
that we want to minimize by finding a path P is utilitarian. Note that the valuation
of a node v ij on LCP not only depends on its own cost but also depends on the reliability ðv it ; v itþ1 Þ of all links v i t v i tþ1 for t ! j. This is a sharp contrast to the majority previous studies on designing strategyproof mechanisms for multihop networks, where the valuation of an agent only depends on its own type and whether it is selected or not. The VCG mechanism can still be applied to design a strategyproof mechanism in which the payment for node v i j is
Recall that here cðv i jÀ1 ; v i j Þ is the marginal cost declared by node v i jÀ1 for forwarding a unit amount of data to node v i j . This could be uniform for all neighbors. Algorithm 6 presents our routing scheme. In our method, the sender decides whether to perform routing using some criterion to ensure the strategyproofness. Clearly, the criterion should not be dependent on any information controlled by any node on the LCP. Recall that we assume that a node can only declare its marginal (node or link) cost for forwarding. We choose the a special bridge B s;d min for each relay node v i j to ensure that the cost of this bridge is at least the VCG payment to this node v i j under the transport layer reliability model. We leave it as a future work to design a possibly tight criterion by using some special bridges. The following theorem can be proved by directly using the VCG mechanism, thus, the proof is omitted here: Theorem 14. Truth-telling is a dominant strategy and forwarding truthfully is an SPE when our algorithms for routing with transport layer reliability are used.
When both the cost and the reliability are private information, one may expect that Algorithm 6 is still a strategyproof routing scheme. Unfortunately, it is not true. The reason is now the valuation of a node over an outcome not only depends on its own service cost, but also depends on the service reliability of other agents. This violates the requirement of VCG mechanism. In this case, the least cost path output is monotonic: when an agent on the LCP reduces its cost (in either node or link cost model), or increases its link reliabilities, the agent is still on the LCP using new vector of cost and reliabilities. Then a mechanism can always be designed using LCP as an output [24] , [38] .
SELFISH PRINCIPALS
Unfortunately, when the sender has a finite valuation and could be selfish, the following result was proved in [39] :
Lemma 15 [39] . When the sender has a finite valuation and is selfish in declaring its valuation, no mechanism using the shortest path routing is strategyproof for all intermediate agents and the sender, while it is still budget-balanced.
Here, a mechanism is budget-balanced if the money paid to all relay nodes is same as the money charged to the sender. It was proved in [39] that, in a strategyproof mechanism, the total charge from the sender could be as small as only 1 n of the total payment to relay agents when we require that the charge from the sender is at most the total payment to relay agents. Thus, there is a trade-off of budget balance and strategyproof when the sender and the relay nodes are all selfish. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the sender and the principal are truthful. Thus, it is possible to design a budget-balanced and strategyproof mechanism.
In [12] , Eidenbenz et al. proposed a novel scheme COMMIT that uses the cost of the global replacement path as the measurement whether a routing will take place. It has been pointed out in [12] that the protocol COMMIT is also not budget-balanced: they assume that the receiver will subsidize all the deficit by the sender. It is not difficult to show that the protocols presented here can also be extended to strategyproof protocols that deal with selfish principals when budget imbalance is allowed. Let ðs; dÞ be the maximum willing payment by the principals. Let m ¼ 0 ðs; dÞ be the declared willing payment by the source node, which could be different from ðs; dÞ. Let P ÀLCP be the "least cost path" (depending on the routing requirement) connecting the source and destination nodes without using any nodes and links of the least cost path LCP. Path P ÀLCP is also called global replacement path in [12] . Let EðP ÀLCP Þ be the cost of the path P ÀLCP . We then present the following routing and charging protocols:
1. We perform the routing when m ! EðP ÀLCP Þ and the price paid by the sender is EðP ÀLCP Þ. 2. If the routing is performed, each node on the least cost path LCP will be paid based on protocols discussed in previous sections.
Lemma 16 . This scheme is strategyproof for both sender and the relay nodes.
Proof. When the routing is performed, the profit of the principal is ðs; dÞ À EðP ÀLCP Þ. Since EðP ÀLCP Þ is independent of the actions by the principal, the principal cannot gain anything by reporting false valuation m 0 6 ¼ ðs; dÞ. When ðs; dÞ < EðP ÀLCP Þ, reporting a larger m will make the principal to potentially lose money. Second, the value EðP ÀLCP Þ is independent of the nodes on the shortest path, thus, the node on LCP cannot report a false value to improve its profit also. When EðP ÀLCP Þ > m, to potentially make profit, a node on the shortest path must report some false cost such that the LCP changes and thus the path P ÀLCP changes. To do so, it must report a higher cost since reporting a lower cost does not change LCP. This implies that the cost of the global replacement path P ÀLCP will not be reduced at all. Thus, the condition EðP ÀLCP Þ > m still holds, and thus, the routing will not be performed.
When EðP ÀLCP Þ m, the routing is performed. In this case, the payment to a relay node will be based on our protocols and we have already proved that they cannot report false value to improve its profit. Thus, in both cases, relay nodes cannot misreport to improve its profit.
t u
Similarly, we can adapt our protocols (described in Algorithms 3 and 6) for reliable link layer routing and reliable transport layer routing to deal with potentially selfish senders as follows: The principal will let the sender to perform the routing when Lemma 17. These modified schemes are strategyproof for both sender and the relay nodes.
However, these protocols are not budget-balanced. Recall that it has been proved in [39] that no strategyproof protocols exist that use the least cost path for routing and are also budget-balanced.
PERFORMANCE STUDY
We conduct extensive simulations to study the performance of our routing schemes for hidden information and hidden actions. Given a routing path P, we define the overpayment ratio (OR) of P as % A ðPÞ ¼ P A ðPÞ cðPÞ , where P A ðPÞ is the total payment to all agents on the path by a scheme A, and cðPÞ is the total cost of all agents on the path. Clearly, % A ðPÞ ! 1 for any payment scheme A developed in this paper, e.g., Nash payment, VCG payment. In the worst case, the ratio %ðPÞ could be as large as OðnÞ when VCG payment is used for a network of n nodes [2] . In [2] , the authors proposed the ratio by comparing the total payment PðPÞ with the cost of the new path obtained from the graph GnP, which represents the graph G without P.
In our simulations, we generate random networks with n nodes, where n is a parameter. To reflect the wireless network property, we first randomly generate n nodes placed in a unit area and the transmission range is r n . Each pair of nodes within distance r n will form a link with a probability p. In order to ensure that the network is biconnected with high probability, it is proved in [4] , [42] that the probability p and r n should satisfy npr 2 n ! log n þ cðnÞ for some cðnÞ > 0. We first set the probability p ¼ c Á log n n , where c is a constant. We randomly pick m ¼ p Á n 2 =2:0 pairs of nodes within distance r n and construct a link between them. To ensure that the graph is 2-connected, we check, for each node, whether its removal will disconnect the network; if it does, we add a new edge using nodes from two disconnected components. For all results reported here, the network is always 2-connected. We randomly assign the cost and the reliability to nodes and links. The cost is uniformly drawn from all integers in ½1; 40 and the reliability of a link is uniformly drawn from 0:01 Á k with integer k in ½1; 100. By choosing different parameters, we study which aspects of the network affect the cost of the selected paths and the overpayment ratio. The results reported here are the average of 50 independent runs, where we do routing for a fixed pair of nodes in every run.
Effect of Network Size
We first study the effect of the network size, for n 2 ½70; 90. In this simulation, we fix the parameter p ¼ 0:1054337, which results in 2-connected random networks, w.h.p., for results reported here. We measure the performances of our protocols based on the following metrics: the ratio of the Nash payment over the actual cost, the ratio of the VCG payment over the actual cost, and the ratio of the total bridge cost over the actual cost. Recall that in all our protocols, the bridge cost is not the cost paid by the sender. The total payment by the sender is still the total VCG payment. The bridge cost is only used by the sender to decide whether to perform the routing: routing is performed if the valuation is at least the total bridge cost.
We first study the cost variations when the network size changes under different reliability models (link layer reliability or transport layer reliability). We find that costs decrease when the network size increases. The following relations always hold: actual cost is less than the Nash payment, Nash payment is less than the VCG payment, and VCG payment is less than the bridge cost. Figs. 2 and 3 plot the costs and ratios for different models when the network size changes. We also specifically study the Nash payment over actual cost, the VCG payment over actual cost, and the bridge cost over actual cost (which is only for link layer reliability). We observe that the ratios do not have a pattern depending on the network size. In our simulations, we find that the Nash cost is about 1.5 times of the actual total cost of all relaying agents, the VCG payment is about 1.5 to 2 times of the actual cost, while the bridge costs are about 2 to 2.5 times of the actual cost of the routing path. The simulation results show that the price for achieving truthful declaration from all relay agents is small: the payment needed by truthful VCG mechanism is only about 4=3 times of the payment by Nash equilibrium. Note that the scheme by Nash Equilibrium has its own disadvantages: it is more expensive to implement this scheme since it requires multiple iterations to converge, and the output is also not stable since there may have multiple Nash equilibriums. The fact that the bridge cost is about 2 to 2.5 times of the actual total cost and about 3/2 times of the VCG payment to all relay agents implies that some additional price is required to induce the truthfulness from all relay agents when the sender has a finite valuation: it will not be able to perform routing even its valuation is enough to cover the VCG payment (but smaller than the total bridge cost). In other words, Nash payment may be better off if performing routing is more important than inducing truthfulness from all agents.
Effect of Network Density
We then study other effects by fixing the network size (n ¼ 70 in the results reported here). We specifically study the effect of the network density by changing the average number of links in a random network. Figs. 4 and 5 show different costs when the network density changes from the minimum p 0 needed for connectivity to p 0 þ 0:09 with step size 0.01. We can observe that the costs decrease when the network density increases. This is because the path length will decrease and the competition for the shortest path also will increase when the network density increases. On the other hand, the ratios do not change much when the link layer reliability is implemented. We also find that the ratio of the VCG payment over the actual cost and the ratio of the Nash payment over the actual cost do seem to decrease when the transport layer reliability is implemented and each node has uniform cost to all its outgoing links.
RELATED WORK
In any multihop routing scheme, cooperation by the intermediate nodes is essential for the successful delivery of traffic. In the past years, several new routing protocols [1] , [13] , [14] , [28] , [32] , [40] , [41] have been proposed to deal with possible selfishness of these intermediate nodes.
Generally, there are two approaches to deal with the potential selfish nodes: 1) mechanism design or 2) reputation.
Routing has been an important part of the algorithmic mechanism design from the very beginning when the costs of agents are hidden information. Nisan and Ronen [30] provided a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism using VCG for optimal unicast route selection in a centralized computational model. Feigenbaum et al. [13] then addressed the truthful low-cost routing in a different network model. Their mechanism again is the VCG mechanism. Optimal methods are presented in [18] to compute payments to all links and in [40] to compute the payments to all individual nodes. Anderegg and Eidenbenz [1] recently proposed a similar routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks based on VCG mechanism again. They assumed that each link has a cost and each node is a selfish agent. Wang et al. [41] proposed several strategyproof mechanisms for multicast such that every selfish node will maximize its profit in the multicast structure if it declares its privately known cost truthfully. Qiu et al. [32] studied the selfish routing in Internet-like environments. In [5] , [6] , [19] , a secure mechanism to stimulate nodes to cooperate is presented. Chen and Nahrstedt [8] provided iPass, an auction-based scheme, to encourage forwarding behavior in mobile ad hoc networks. Combining with topology control, Eidenbenz et al. [11] , [12] provided a truthful protocol COMMIT based on VCG payment scheme. Zhong et al. [46] showed that there does not exist a dominant strategy solution in the forwarding subgame and present Corsac, a cooperation-optimal protocol consisting of a routing protocol and a forwarding protocol.
Achieving cooperation among selfish terminals in network was previously addressed by several authors using mainly reputation-based scheme. In [43] , Yu and Liu provided a mechanism to bound the malicious attack. In [44] , Yu et al. provided a set of mechanisms in which nodes kept a route traffic observer and built friendship with other nodes to monitor the route and detect cheating nodes. Jaramillo and Srikant [20] presented DARWIN to quickly restore the cooperation after falsely detecting a node as selfish. In [35] , [36] , several methods are presented such that nodes' actions will form Nash Equilibrium and the energy efficiency is achieved at the equilibrium. In [28] , nodes, which agree to relay traffic but do not, are termed as misbehaving. Their protocol avoids routing through these misbehaving nodes based on Watchdog and Pathrater.
Feldman and Chuang [14] , [15] studied the hidden action in multihop routing. They studied the mechanism design for UDP model (given the fixed routing path) with known uniform cost and reliability for agents, with known uniform reliability but private cost for agents. In [21] , [22] , [23] , Kannan et al. developed a game-theoretic metric to measure the contribution of individual node and the qualitative performance of different routing mechanisms. In [27] , Liu and Krishnamachari presented a polynomial-time algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium path.
CONCLUSION
There are still a number of challenges left unsolved. The first challenge is to design a proper routing scheme when an agent can manipulate multiple parameters (e.g., its costs and the reliability). The second challenge is to eliminate hidden action under hidden information. Note that [14] , [15] mainly deal with hidden action after the routing path is already selected.
Note that in certain ad hoc routing protocols, routing paths may be used just once or a few times in a mobile environment. Such a high discount rate for future interactions enables a lazy node to drop traffic irrelevant to itself and allows malicious one to selectively forward traffic or propagate false information. This makes the detection of hidden action much difficult. A possible approach to overcome free riding is to let members form small groups. New members must first transact with other members of the neighborhood to establish legitimacy. Once trust has been established inside the clustering of nodes, outside transactions can occur through established channels between groups. This could establish a credible observation threat to forestall hidden action. The backbone-based routing may thus become favorite since routing tables rarely change significantly and repeated interactions occur frequently. So any persistent failures will be quickly noted. We thus need to study the impact of possible hidden actions on various backbone-based routings, e.g., [7] , [26] , [34] .
